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COMMENT

HOW THE SANDOVAL RULING WILL
AFFECT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
PLAINTIFFS
JOHN DIBARIf
INTRODUCTION

Despite any transgressions resulting from the current
political climate, our government rarely insidiously and overtly
discriminates against its people on the basis of race.
Unfortunately, discrimination still plays a role in our society, but
its presence has become harder to detect. The ubiquitous
presence of environmental hazards in minority communities is
evidence of this discrimination. This Comment intendeds to
show how minority communities have fought against such
discrimination, how the Supreme Court has recently altered that
fight, and where communities are left in their quest to eradicate
unfair treatment.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Environmental justice represents the methods of dealing
with environmental racism.1 "Environmental racism" refers to
the inequitable distribution of environmental hazards 2 to
t J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law, B.A., May
2000, Boston College.
I Michael D. Mattheisen, Applying the Disparate Impact Rule of Law to
Environmental Permitting Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 24 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 3 (2000).
2 This includes the distribution of "garbage dumps, air pollution, lead
poisoning, toxic waste production and disposal, pesticide poisoning, noise pollution,
occupational hazard, and rat bites." LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE
GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
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minority communities.3
Studies demonstrate that minority
communities are subject to locally undesirable land uses more
often than predominantly white communities. 4 For instance,
according to the United Church of Christ study, that was
published in 1987, three out of the five largest commercial
hazardous

waste landfills were located

in

areas

populated

predominantly by minorities. 5
JUSTICE MOVEMENT 54 (Richard Delgado et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter COLE &
FOSTER]. Furthermore, the authors cite the 1992 National Law Journal study
which found that "[there is a racial divide in the way the U.S. government cleans
up toxic waste sites and punishes polluters. White communities see faster action,
better results and stiffer penalties than communities where blacks, Hispanics and
other minorities live. This unequal protection often occurs whether the community
is wealthy or poor." Id. at 57 (alteration in original).
3 The term "environmental racism" is credited to the former executive director
of the Commission for Racial Justice and former executive director of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Rev. Dr. Benjamin
Chavis, as he was preparing to present a report in 1987. See Richard J. Lazarus,
"EnvironmentalRacism! That's What It Is.", 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 255, 257 (2000).
Dr. Chavis is also credited with using the term in 1993 where he defined it as "the
deliberate targeting of communities of color for toxic waste facilities and the official
sanctioning of the presence of life-threatening poisons and pollutants in
communities of color." Sandra Geiger, Article:, An Alternative Legal Tool for
Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Takings Clause, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 201, 201 n.3 (1998) (citing Environmental Racism: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights, Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong. 3-4 (1993) (statement of Benjamin F. Chavis, Exec. Dir., Comm'n on Racial
Justice)). Although Dr. Chavis coined the term, others have tried to define it as well.
See Julia B. Latham Worsham, DisparateImpact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section
602, Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
631, 636 (2000) (quoting Professor Robert Bullard who defined environmental
racism as "[any policy, practice, or directive that, intentionally or unintentionally,
differentially impacts or disadvantages individuals, groups, or communities based
on race or color; as well as the exclusionary and restrictive practices that limit
participation by people of color in decision-making boards, commissions, and staffs")
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
4 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 2, at 176-83 (citing numerous articles and
studies from around the nation showing an overwhelming trend that minorities
bear the burden of environmental hazards but also noting that some studies found
income level to be the defining characteristic as opposed to race).
5 See Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI. Making Recipient
Agencies Justify Their Siting Decisions, 73 TUL. L. REV. 787, 790-91 n.9 (1999)
(citing a 1987 Study, "Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States," conducted by
the Commission for Racial Justice, United Church of Christ (UCC), which found
that race played a significant role in the siting of commercial hazardous waste
facilities & a 1983 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) study entitled "Siting of
Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status
of the Surrounding Communities," which found that African-Americans constituted
a majority of the population in three out of four communities where landfills were
located in eight southeastern states) (citations omitted).
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Several paths lead to environmental justice. In some cases,
6
groups of citizens band together to fight environmental hazards.
In other cases, legislators and corporations consider the interests
of minority and low-income communities when they develop
plans for the municipality, city, or state.
In addition,
administrative agencies have recognized the problem of
environmental racism and they have attempted to ensure their
policies neither inadvertently nor adversely affect minority
7
populations.
Despite these efforts, environmental racism still exists. The
primary reason for the continued existence of environmental
racism is the nearly impossible burden of proof faced by
environmental justice plaintiffs. Environmental justice plaintiffs
must prove either a facially discriminatory intent or an
actionable
discriminatory
effect,
i.e.,
an
effect
so
disproportionate that the only possible justification is a
discriminatory intent.
With the burden so high, courts
continually shut their doors to environmental justice plaintiffs.
Recently, the Supreme Court added to the burden of achieving
environmental justice by removing an alternative avenue of
relief. In Alexander v. Sandoval,8 the Court held that § 602 of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not create a freestanding private
cause of action for plaintiffs to enforce regulations promulgated
thereunder. 9 For reasons discussed below, many environmental
justice plaintiffs had previously relied on this private cause of
action to seek redress. This Comment will evaluate other causes
of action available to these plaintiffs in the wake of the Sandoval
decision, how those causes of action differ from § 602, and the
impact the Court's decision will have on minority communities.' 0

6 See, e.g., New York Urban League, Inc. v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d
Cir. 1995) (per curiam); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (D. N.J. 2001).
7 In 1983, the Supreme Court noted that "every Cabinet Department and about
40 federal agencies had adopted standards interpreting Title VI [of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act] to bar programs with a discriminatory impact." Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 619 (1983).
8 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).

9 Id.
10 This

Comment will focus mainly on environmental justice plaintiffs fighting
undesirable land uses. The arguments and law regarding the causes of action,
however, are applicable to most other environmental justice disputes.
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The History of the Environmental Justice Movement

The quest for environmental justice began as an offshoot of
the 1960s civil rights movement.
Environmental justice,
however, did not receive national attention until the early 1980s,
when a series of protests occurred in Warren County, North
Carolina. The citizens of Warren County, who were protesting
the siting of a polychlorinated biphenyl landfill in a
predominantly African-American county, finally gave the
movement national exposure.1
Subsequently, environmental
justice has been the subject of a variety of studies 12 and volumes
of academic discourse; 3 it has also been addressed in several
cases involving citizens trying to prevent environmentally
adverse policies from affecting their community. 14 The President
of the United States has even recognized environmental racism.
In 1994, then President Clinton issued Executive Order No.
12,898, entitled Federal Actions to Address Environmental
11 See Carolyn Graham & Jennifer B. Grills, Environmental Justice: A Survey
of Federaland State Responses, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 239 (1997); Adam Swartz,
Environment Justice: A Survey of the Ailments of Environmental Racism, 2 HOW.
SCROLL SOC. J. REV. 35, 36 (1994).
12 See Mank, supra note 5, at 790; see also Michele L. Knorr, Environmental
Injustice: Inequities Between Empirical Data and Federal, State Legislative and
JudicialResponses, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 71, 77-80 (1997) (citing a GAO study, a
United Church of Christ study, a 1992 National Law Journal study, which found
that minority and low income communities receive a greater share of pollutants but
these violators are required to pay less stringent fines than those in Caucasian
communities, and a 1994 World Council of Churches study, which found
environmental injustice with examples of environmental dangers in relation to
minority communities) (citations omitted).
13 See generally, Geiger, supra note 3; Mattheisen, supra note 1; Swartz, supra
note 11.
14See New York City Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250,
252-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (alleging that the sale and destruction of community
gardens would have an adverse impact on black and Hispanic communities); S.
Bronx Coalition for Clean Air v. Conroy, 20 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(discussing the issuance of a permit to operate a 3,000 ton per day solid waste
station in the Harlem River Yard site); Chester Residents v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing citizens who challenged the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection's ("PADEP") issuance of a permit for the operation of a
waste disposal facility in a primarily African-American community when the
PADEP had already done so several times in the previous few years), rev'd 132 F.3d
925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S. 974 (1998); Coalition of Concerned Citizens v.
Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 112-13 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (discussing plaintiffs' argument
that the planning and siting of a proposed highway had a disproportionate impact
on minority citizens); Bean v. S.W. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 674-75
(S.D. Tex. 1979) (fighting the approval of a permit to operate a solid waste facility in
Harris County, Texas).
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Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.15
This order provided,
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law...
each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental
justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as
appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health
or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities
on minority populations and low-income populations in the
United States .... 16
While the order did not have the effect of law, nor could it be
enforced, it served to provide guidance for federal agencies in the
exercise of their rule-making powers.
Despite the increasing national attention given to
environmental racism, it is far from being universally accepted.
The majority of critics believe the problem is not as extreme or
severe as portrayed by environnentalists. 17 Furthermore, critics
contend that in most cases any potential risks of harm are
outweighed by the tangible economic benefits brought to the
community by siting decisions. On this point, environmentalists
argue that environmental justice policies, necessary for the
protection of the health and welfare of minority communities,
8
outweigh any possibly derived economic benefits.'
B.
1.

Development of Litigation Strategies
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment &
§ 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act Are Not Practical
Solutions
The movement for environmental justice is based on the
15 See Mank, supra note 5, at 793.

16 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3

C.F.R. 859-60 (1994), reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 4321

(1997).
17 See Mank, supra note 5, at 792-93. Indeed, there are studies that lend credit
to this position. See Knorr, supra note 12, at 82-83 (identifying (1) a March 1994
Washington University Center for the study of American Business study which
questioned the solutions presented by environmental justice supporters and argued
that research does not support claims of discriminatory siting; (2) a 1994 University

of Massachusetts at Amherst study that criticized the 1987 United Church of Christ
study and found that commercial hazardous waste facilities were more likely to be
located in middle-class Caucasian neighborhoods; and (3) a 1995 General

Accounting Office study that concluded minorities and low-income populations do
not bear a greater amount of municipal solid waste landfills) (citations omitted).
18 See Mank, supra note 5, at 793 & n.15.
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ideals of the civil rights movement of the 1960s,19 and as such,
plaintiffs have framed their claims as violations of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 The burden
of proof in a discrimination cause of action under the Equal
Protection clause is high.. The Supreme Court has held a
plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with intent to
discriminate above and beyond a discriminatory effect or
impact. 21 The Court then elaborated upon the meaning of intent
in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney22 when it stated that a
"'[d]iscriminatory purpose'. .. implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course
of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effect on an identifiable group." 23 ' Under this definition,
a showing of a disparate impact is just one of many factors that a
court must consider in determining intentional discrimination.
In addition to whether an official action " 'bears more heavily on
one race than another,' "24 in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., the Court set forth several other
25
factors to be eonsidered to find intentional discrimination.
Indeed, there have been several instances where a court has
refused to see disparity rise to the level of intentional

19 See Richard J. Lazarus, Symposium, Civil Rights in the New Decade:
Highways and Bi-ways for Environmental Justice, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 569, 570-72
(2000-01) (illustrating the overlap of civil rights and the environmental movement
by pointing out the site of a proposed landfill in a small town along Route 80, where
Dr. Martin Luther King walked after "Bloody Sunday" in 1965).
20 The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21 See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
22 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
23 Id. at 279 (citations omitted).
24 429 U.S. at 266 (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (1976)).
25 Id. at 266-67 (deciding that the following factors particularly indicate a clear
pattern of adverse policy decisions that are unexplainable on grounds other than
race and should be taken into account: (1) substantive departures from the routine
decision-making process; (2) the historical background of the particular decision; (3)
the specific sequence of events leading up to the decision; and (4) the legislative and
administrative history).
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discrimination. 26 The burden placed on the plaintiffs makes
defending such allegations as simple as offering a plausible
reason for the decision, even though it might not be the actual
27
motivation.
Plaintiffs have also turned to §§ 601 and 602 of the 1964
Civil Rights Act to seek redress. 28 A necessary qualification for
§ 601 and its effectuating provision, § 602, however, is that
plaintiffs may bring suit only against those subject to the
conditions and mandates of Title VI, in other words, recipients of
federal funds. 29 Unfortunately, § 601 has been held to require
the same showing of intentional discrimination as a cause of
Therefore, the
action under the equal protection clause. 30
loom just
justice
plaintiffs
for
environmental
hurdles
evidentiary
as large in the civil rights context as in the equal protection
context.
2.

Use of § 602 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act

Due to the difficulties of satisfying the burden of proof under
§ 601, environmental justice plaintiffs have turned to the
administrative agency regulations implementing § 602 to allege
a discriminatory disparate impact. § 602 explicitly gives federal
agencies the power to adopt regulations to enforce compliance
with § 601.31 On that basis, some courts, prior to Sandoval,
26 See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991), af/d,
977 F. 2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb
County & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885-87 (D. Ga. 1989), afd, 896 F.2d
1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. S.W. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-78
(S.D. Tex. 1979).
27 See Amanda C.L. Vig, Using Title VI to Salvage Civil Rights from Waste:
Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir.
1997), 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 907, 914-15 (1999) (asserting that defendants can use
compliance with National Environmental Policy Act as a pretext for actions or can
confuse juries and/or judges with elaborate, complicated, and misleading statistics);
see also Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action Under EPA's Title VI
Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (1999) [hereinafter Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action]
(stating that most siting boards and developers can almost always offer a raceneutral justification for a site).
28 See cases cited infra note 32.
29 See Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 28, 28
(Michael B. Gerrard, A.B.A. 1999) [hereinafter Mank, Title VI].
30 See, e.g., Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 563 n.9 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that
both Title VI and the equal protection clause require a showing of intentional
discrimination).
31See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994). It provides in relevant part:
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allowed a private cause of action for plaintiffs to allege a
33
disparate impact 32 in violation of agency regulations.
The courts have dealt with § 602 issues by developing a
specific procedure to allocate the burdens of proving or
disproving a disparate impact on the respective parties. 34 In
Powell v. Ridge, the Third Circuit stated that several courts of
appeals had determined that the burdens of proof, allocated
between the plaintiff and defendant in a Title VI dispute should
closely resemble the burden shifting scheme developed in cases
35
dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
To satisfy a prima facie case, plaintiffs has the burden of
showing the alleged disparate impact resulted from a facially
neutral policy. 36 To accomplish this, the plaintiff must initially
define the "area" or community affected. 37 Next, the plaintiff
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant,
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of § 2000d of this title
with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement
of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in
connection with which the action is taken.
Id.
32 See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 394 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ga. State
Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1421 (11th Cir. 1985)).
33 See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1204 (11th Cir. 1999)
(permitting plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief by showing the challenged action
had a disparate impact on groups protected by the statute); Villanueva v. Carere, 85
F.3d 481, 486-87 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court's ruling that plaintiffs
had not satisfied their burden on their claim of disparate impact); N.Y. Urban
League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1038 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding plaintiffs were
unlikely to succeed based on the factual findings presented); City of Chicago v.
Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 830 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing the district court's conclusion
that a disparate impact existed); Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 983
(9th Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's ruling that defendant violated Title VII).
34 See Powell, 189 F.3d at 393, 394.
35 See id. For examples of cases brought under Title VII, see Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Allen v. Entergy Corp., Inc.,
193 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999), which discussed Title VII's applicability to an ADEA
analysis; Riles, 793 F.2d at 982, which alleged violations of Title VI; and Johnson v.
Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981).
36 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 480 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing
Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993)),
rev'd, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
37 See Bean v. S.W. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 679 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
In Bean, the district court decided whether to group Houston in halves or quadrants
or to focus on census tract data. If the court had used the halves or quadrants
method, a majority of the waste facilities would be located in minority
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must establish a causal link between the disputed practice and
the identified adverse effect. 38 If the defendant can show the
disparate effect would have occurred regardless of the practice,
the plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case. 39 If, however,
the plaintiff does fulfill their prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the defendant to show " 'a substantial legitimate
justification'"40 or a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" 41 for
the allegedly discriminatory practice. 42 If or when the defendant
shows a justification, the plaintiff still has an opportunity to win
by showing the existence of less discriminatory means to
accomplish the same objective. 43
If the plaintiff prevails,
injunctive or declarative relief is the applicable remedy.
II. THE SANDOVAL DECISION
Alexander v. Sandova 44 did not deal with environmental
issues, but the impact of the decision will be felt directly by
environmental justice plaintiffs.
In Sandoval, non-English
speaking residents of Alabama felt discriminated against
because an Alabama law mandated that all driver's license tests
be in written in English. 45 They sued the Alabama Department
of Public Safety and James Alexander, the director, to enjoin the
policy under § 602 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 46 The Court
decided that the Alabama Department of Public Safety was a
recipient of funds from the United States Department of Justice

neighborhoods. Although the court noted that the census tracts may have
underestimated the affected area, it applied that standard since the plaintiffs did
not identify the area impact by the siting. An alternative to the census tract method
is the ZIP code method as used by the General Accounting Office in their 1983 study
and the United Church of Christ's 1987 study. Id.
38 See Elston v. Talladega County Bd.of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir.
1993).
39 See id.
40 N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1417 (11th Cir. 1985)).
41 NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F. 2d 1322, 1333 (3d Cir. 1981).
42 See Mattheisen, supra, note 1 at 23 (noting that a disparate impact may be
justified if there is a "programmatic reason" for the decision to be considered
'business necessity' ") (citations omitted).
43 See N.Y Urban League, 701 F.3d at 1036; Ga. State Conference, 775 F.2d at
1417.
44 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001).
45 Id. at 278-79.
46 Id. at 278.
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and Department of Transportation and was therefore subject to
the restrictions of Title VI. 47 The claimants argued that this
facially neutral policy-led to a discriminatory disparate impact
based on national origin, thereby violating federal agency
regulations which forbid state agencies receiving federal funding
from "'utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination
"48
because of their race, color, or national origin . .
A.

The Majority's Holding

Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted that the Court
was not ruling on whether the Department of Justice or
Department of Transportation regulations were authorized by
§ 602, but rather whether there was a private cause of action to
enforce the regulations. 49 For purposes of rendering a decision in
the present case, the Court assumed the validity of the
implementing regulations. 50
A narrow majority of the Court held that at no point in time
did Congress intend for a private cause of action under § 602.51
The Court further noted that it never had previously created a
private right of action.5 2 Therefore, in the 5-4 ruling, the
Supreme Court found that § 602 of the statute did not confer a
private cause of action and dismissed the claims on this
53
ground.
While Justice Scalia pointed out that it is "beyond dispute"
§ 601 only prohibits intentional discrimination 54 and noted the
Court's failure to uphold the validity of the regulations both in
47 Id.
48 Id.

(quoting Department of Justice § 602 implementing regulations as found
in 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2000) and the comparable Department of Transportation
regulations as set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2000)).
49 Id. at 279.
50 Id. at 282.
51 Id. at 288-89 (finding Congress's lack of intention of private enforcement in

§ 602's language limiting agencies to enforcement of only those rights created by
§ 601).
52 Id. at 282-83 (referring to the fractured decision in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil

Serv. Conm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) and finding that three out of the five justices
who voted to uphold the validity of the disparate impact regulations reserved the
question as to whether there was an opportunity for private enforcement).
53 Id. at 293.

54 See id. at 280-81 (affirming the principle as set forth in Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), that § 601 only proscribes racial classifications
that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment).

2002]

THE SANDOVAL RULING

1029

this case and in a prior decision, 55 it is perhaps more troubling
than the Court's actual holding to see the Court indicating that
it might view federal agency regulations prohibiting a disparate
impact under Title VI as having a flimsy legal foundation, and
therefore subject to invalidation. 56 If this.were to occur, federal
agencies would not be able to proscribe policies implemented by
federal fund recipients that result in a disparate impact.
B.

The Dissent's Argument

The dissent by Justice Stevens contended that § 602
provides for a private cause of action, as evidenced by the
legislative history behind § 602 and prior Supreme Court
decisions and rationales. 57 The dissent also noted that similarly
situated plaintiffs could alternatively bring suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which is a key principle the majority failed to touch
upon. 58 A § 1983 action would allow plaintiffs recourse against
state actors, whether or not federally funded. 59 Furthermore,
Justice Stevens argued "that a violation of regulations adopted
pursuant to Title VI may be established by proof of
discriminatory impact in a § 1983 action against state actors and
60
also in an implied action against private parties."
Justice Stevens derived this opinion from an interpretation
of the fractured ruling in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service

65 See id. at 281-82 (noting that although five justices in Guardiansvoted to
uphold the regulations prohibiting disparate impact, it was not the Court's holding).
56 Id. at 285 ("It is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not
simply apply § 601-since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits ....").
Justice Scalia also referred back to Guardians, in which Justice O'Connor stated in
his concurrence, "If, as five members of this Court concluded in Bakke, the purpose
of Title VI is to proscribe only purposeful discrimination ....regulations that would
proscribe conduct by the recipient having only a discriminatory effect ... do not
simply 'further' the purpose of Title VI; they go well beyond that purpose."
57 See id. at 292-316.
58 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) in relevant part provides:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
59Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 301 n.6.
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Comm'n,6 1 and another prior Supreme Court decision. 62 He
believed that all the Justices in the "Guardians majority
contemplated the availability of private actions brought directly
under the statute," 63 and cited his own opinion from Guardians
to note that relief would have been available under § 1983 in
64
that specific situation as well.
III. PLAINTIFFS' POTENTIAL ROUTES TO RECOURSE
A.

Political:Amend the Statute
Although the Sandoval Court ruled there was no private
cause of action to enforce § 602, Congress can overrule that
decision by altering the language of the statute. Congress could
expand the scope of § 602 with a statement providing that
agency regulations promulgated under § 602 may be enforced
through a private cause of action. Alternatively, it could expand
the scope of § 601 to include a prohibition against policies
leading to a disparate impact. This alternative would require a
build-up of the ,environmental plaintiffs' lobbying presence in
Washington, especially given environmental justice issues are
not high on the list of congressional priorities.
On a broader scale, Congress has considered a national law
to promote environmental justice throughout the nation. The
Environmental Justice Act was proposed with the objective of
"establish[ing]
a program to ensure nondiscriminatory
compliance with environmental, health, and safety laws and to
ensure equal protection of the public health...." 65 Although not
enacted, the consideration of this law helped to gain recognition
for the issue of environmental justice.
Yet environmental justice plaintiffs are not completely
without remedy, as various federal and state laws provide some
61

463 U.S. 582 (1983).

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299 n.5.
Id.; see Guardians,463 U.S. at 607 (White, J., plurality opinion) (finding that
absent a showing of discriminatory intent, a private plaintiff is only allowed
injunctive and non-compensatory relief); id. at 634-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(concluding that compensatory relief is available to private plaintiffs absent a
showing of discriminatory animus). But see id. at 638-39, 643-45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (finding private individuals could recover compensatory damages for
Title VI violations and upholding the effects standard set forth by federal agencies).
64 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299 n.5.
65 138 CONG. REC. 7480 (statement of Sen. Gore).
62
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protection for environmental protection and well-being. 66 These
statutes allow individuals to sue violators and seek injunctive
relief, monetary damages, or both.
B.

Judicial:Alternatives to § 602

1.

Section 1983 and Causes of Action Thereunder
While the Sandoval dissent discussed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 67 more recently, Judge Orlofsky authorized a suit under
this statute in South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey
Dep't of Environmental Protection.68
In South Camden I,
defendants sought to end a preliminary injunction against the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP)
and NJDEP Commissioner Robert Shinn, which granted St.
Lawrence Cement Company's application for air permits to
69
operate its proposed facility.
Five days after the South Camden I court awarded a
preliminary injunction against the NJDEP, the Supreme Court
issued the Sandoval decision. 70 Subsequently, Judge Olorofsky
decided that although the district court was bound by the
Supreme Court's decision disallowing a private right of action
under § 602, there was nothing to prevent the court from
allowing a suit alleging a violation of the § 602 implementing
regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,71 and again granted a
72
preliminary injunction.
66 See generally Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6992(d) (1994); The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
67 See 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68 See 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D. N.J. 2001) (The South Camden I court was the
first federal court to rule on a Title VI disparate impact case after the Supreme
Court's Sandoval decision [hereinafter South Camden I]; see also Lucero v. Detroit
Pub. Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (concluding that plaintiffs
could bring suit for an alleged violation of the U. S. Department of Education's § 602
implementing regulations under § 1983). See generally Bradford C. Mank, Using §
1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 323
(2001) [hereinafter Mank, Using § 1983] (noting that regardless of the Supreme
Court's ruling on private causes of action for § 602 violations, plaintiffs would still
have a chance to bring suit under § 1983).
69 South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.

at 509.
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To reach this conclusion, the court went through an
exhaustive analysis of the availability of a § 1983 claim in this
context. First, the court applied the analysis set forth in Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles to decide whether a §
1983 remedy was available to plaintiffs.7 3 Under Golden State
Transit, a "[p]laintiff must assert the violation of a federal
right"74 and show that Congress did not foreclose a remedy under
§ 1983 by providing a "comprehensive enforcement mechanism
for protection of a federal right."75 The South Camden I court
decided that § 602 and the subsequent regulations promulgated
by the EPA created a federally protected right after applying the
three-part Blessing v. Freestone test.7 6 The South Camden I
court found that Title VI was meant to benefit individuals who
were subjected to racial discrimination, and that the plaintiffs fit
in the class of persons Congress intended the law to reach. 77 In
addition, the court found the specific language of the EPA's
implementing regulations revealed an intent to benefit those
specific types of plaintiffs.7 8 The court noted, therefore, that
protecting the asserted right to be free from discrimination
would not strain judicial competence.7 9 Finally, the court
concluded that Title VI and the EPA's implementing regulations
mandated that the state fulfill its obligations as required under
§ 1983.80
73 Id. at 519-20.
74 Id. at 529.
75 Id. at 519 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493
U.S. 103, 106 (1989)).
76 South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 529; see Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S.
329, 340-41 (1997) (citing three factors that courts traditionally looked at to decide
whether a statutory provision led to a federal right). Those three factors are: (1)
whether Congress intended the provision to benefit the plaintiff; (2) whether the
plaintiff could demonstrate that the asserted protected right was not so "Vague and
amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence; and (3) whether
the statute unambiguously imposed a binding obligation on the states. Id.
77 South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
78 Id. at 536-37 (citing EPA regulation under 40 C.F.R. § 7.30, which instituted
a general prohibition against "discrimination... [on the basis] of... race, color, [or]
national origin" and 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) which issued a specific prohibition to federal
fund recipients from "using criteria or methods.., substantially impacting the
accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to ... race, color,
national origin, or sex").
79 Id. at 540 (citing several cases where federal courts developed the framework
for disparate impact litigation in the context of Title VI).
80 Id. at 542 (explaining that the use of"shall" in both Title VI and in the EPA's
implementing regulations and the conditioning of federal funds on compliance
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The next hurdle the court had to overcome to conclude that
§ 1983 was a viable alternative was whether Congress explicitly
or implicitly foreclosed the plaintiffs' ability to enforce the EPA
regulations under § 1983.81 After looking at Supreme Court
jurisprudence addressing the enforceability of federal rights
under § 198382 and reviewing the EPA's Draft Revised Guidance
Complaints
Administrative
for Investigating Title VI
Challenging Permits,8 3 the court found that "[the] generalized
enforcement power of the EPA ... is insufficient to meet the high
threshold the Supreme Court has established... which may be
a
that they demonstrate
so comprehensive
deemed
Congressional intent to foreclose recourse to Section 1983."84
The only remedy provided by Congress for violations of § 602
is to terminate federal funding in order to prevent the
proliferation of any programs or policies that lead to
discrimination under governmental auspices. As the Supreme
Court decided in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority,8 5 the power to cut off federal funds is "insufficient to
indicate a congressional intention to foreclose Section 1983
remedies."8 6 In contrast, the Court in Middlesex County Sewage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers viewed the enforcement
provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as creating
many specific statutory remedies, including citizen suit
provisions, civil and criminal penalties, and compliance orders as
enough to remove enforcement by § 1983.87 Similarly, in Smith
v. Robinson, because the Education of the Handicapped Act
allowed for several tailored local administrative procedures to be
followed by judicial review, the Court decided that to allow a
plaintiff to go straight to court with a § 1983 claim would render
all those procedures worthless.8 8 Thus, there does not seem to be
much argument against the South Camden I court's decision
indicate Congress's desire to make the obligations mandatory).
81 See id. at 542-43.
82 See id. at 544 (concluding that the Supreme Court found a "remedial scheme
sufficiently comprehensive to supplant § 1983" in only two cases: Middlesex County
Sewage Auth. v. Natl Sea Clarnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), and Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (citation omitted)).
83 65 Fed. Reg. 39650, 39673 (June 27, 2000).
84 South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
85 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
86 Id. at 428.
87 See 453 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1981).
88 See 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
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that Congress did not install such a comprehensive system for
enforcement in Title VI as to remove the possibility of a § 1983
claim against state officials violating federally protected rights.
Notwithstanding the approval of the Sandoval dissent and
Judge Orlofsky's thorough discussion of the use of § 1983 within
the context of § 602's implementing regulations, the Third
Circuit recently reversed the district court's determination that
the regulations promulgated under § 602 can be effectuated
under a § 1983 suit.8 9 Despite a vigorous dissent, the circuit
court concluded that "a federal regulation alone may not create a
right enforceable through section 1983 not already found in the
enforcing statute."90 It seems as though the Third Circuit agreed
with Justice Scalia's contention in Sandoval that "[a]gencies may
play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself."91
That is, agencies may not authorize a private cause of action by
way of an implementing regulation, and agency regulations are
not federal rights enforceable through § 1983, unless Congress
intends otherwise.
The Third Circuit distinguished several cases the district
court had relied upon to support its proposition that federal
regulations may be the basis for federal rights enforceable
through § 1983. The first case distinguished by the circuit court
was Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority.92 According to the circuit court, Wright held that a
federal right is created by a statutory provision only in
combination with the relevant regulations .3 Next, the Third
Circuit distinguished three of its previous cases to show there
was no precedent for the district court's decision. 94 The court
89 See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,

790-91 (3d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter South Camden III.
90 Id. at 790.

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.
92 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
93 See South Camden 1I, 274 F.3d at 783. The issue in Wright was whether
HUD regulations specifying how much rent could be charged to public housing
tenants created a federal right enforceable by § 1983. According to the Third
Circuit, the Wright court found that the statutory provision of creating a ceiling on
tenants' rent clearly authorized the HUD regulations implementing that ceiling and
that the statute was undeniably meant to benefit the plaintiffs. The Third Circuit
then said, "inasmuch as the [Section 602] disparate impact regulations go far
beyond the intentional discrimination interdiction in section 601, the district court's
reliance on Wright was misplaced." Id.
94 See id. at 783-85 (distinguishing Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999)); W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11
91
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then noted the split in authority between the other Circuits, and
decided to follow the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. 95 The court
declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's decision and reasoning as
set forth in Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn.96 In Loschiavo, the
Sixth Circuit allowed a § 1983 action to proceed against a
violation of FCC regulations after deciding that the regulation
was designed to benefit the plaintiffs, was mandatory, and was
97
not beyond judicial enforcement.
Although there is a split in authority between circuits
addressing the issue as to whether § 1983 is available to enforce
§ 602 regulations, the majority of courts addressing the issue
have sided with the Third Circuit. At present, district courts in
Florida, New York, and Oregon have determined that Congress
did not intend for § 602 to create a federally protected right.98
(3d Cir. 1989); Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1984)). The Circuit court
found that the Powell court did not expressly answer the question whether a
regulation standing alone could create a federal right that could be enforced under §
1983, but rather "assume[d]" it could. Id. at 784-85. Similarly, the Circuit court
found that the Alexander court had "simply concluded" that the regulation at issue
created a federal right. Id. at 783. In that case, the statute created a right to
supplemental food for those who qualified, whereas the right deemed enforceable
under § 1983 was the right to a fair hearing upon termination of benefits. The Third
Circuit also found that their previous decision in Casey was not on point in this case
because the question in Casey was whether the statute itself created a federal right
under § 1983. Id. at 784.
95 Id. at 785-86 (citing Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997) & Smith
v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1987) for the idea that an administrative regulation
cannot create an enforceable federal right if the regulation goes beyond the scope of
the statutory provision). The South Camden II court also noted that Smith found no
federal right to have vocational rehabilitation services through the implementing
regulations of the Social Security Act, and that Harris found a Medicaid regulation
which required the provision of non-emergency transportation to and from providers
to be too removed from the Congressional intent for it to be enforceable right under
§ 1983. Id. at 786.
96 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994). The Third Circuit also found the lower court's
reliance on Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188 (9th Cir. 1995) to be misplaced
as it found the Ninth Circuit in Buckley to have relied on the federal statute and the
implementing regulations together, as opposed to the implementing regulations
alone, to find an enforceable federal right. Id. at 785. In Buckley, the Ninth Circuit
found that the Act unambiguously conferred a federal right and decided that the Act
was designed to benefit the plaintiffs, the Act was mandatory to the states, and that
it was not too amorphous for the judiciary to enforce. See Buckley v. City of
Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 192 (9th Cir. 1995).
97 Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1994).
98 See Ceaser v. Pataki, No. 98 Civ. 8532, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5098, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2002) (concluding that because the regulation promulgated
pursuant to § 602 went beyond what was proscribed by § 601, no federal right was
created for purposes of § 1983); Foster Children Bonnie L. v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d
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Despite the majority of decisions agreeing there is no
enforceable right, the fact of a split in Circuit authority means
there is a glimmer of hope for environmental justice plaintiffs. It
is worthwhile, therefore, to expand upon what a plaintiff must
prove in order to win relief against a state actor.
First, a plaintiff must assert a claim against a " 'person' who
'under color of state law' deprived plaintiff of 'rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the
United States."99 In South Camden I, the court first determined
whether defendant Robert Shinn was considered a "person"
within the context of § 1983.100 To do so, the court considered
the rule set forth in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,101
which provided that when sued for monetary damages, "neither
a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
'persons' under § 1983"; therefore, such defendants are immune
from suit under § 1983. 102 The South Camden I court recognized
a secondary holding in Will, providing that when sued for
prospective injunctive relief, state officials were considered
'persons' under the statute. 10 3 Because the South Camden I
1321, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (relying on Sandoval's determination that § 602 does not
have any "rights-creating" language and determining that there is no good reason to
allow a private § 602 cause of action against state actors and not against private
individuals); Lechuga v. Crosley, No. 01-450, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23589, at *13
(D. Or. Nov. 14, 2001) (finding "[tihe regulation adopted pursuant to Section 602
was not specifically intended to benefit individuals and, therefore, did not create a
federal right enforceable by individuals."). But see Robinson v. State of Kansas, 295
F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with Steven's dissent in Sandoval by
holding that prospective injunctive relief can be sought through 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against state officials for violations of § 602 regulations); White v. Engler, 188 F.
Supp. 2d, 730, 744-45 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (applying the same test as the district court
in South Camden I to determine the regulation in issue set forth an enforceable
right under § 1983).
99 South Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1994)).
100 Id. at 525.
101 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
102 South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71). The
Eleventh Amendment has long established that States are immune from being sued
in federal court by any private person or corporation. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The Supreme Court decreed, however, many years ago in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), that state officials and agencies may be sued in federal court. See Quern
v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1979) (stating that Congress could abrogate the
States immunity from monetary judgements, but § 1983 was not an example of this
Congressional power).
103 See South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 58 &
Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999)). This law also is based on the Supreme
Court's ruling in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which held that state officials
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plaintiffs were suing for injunctive relief, Shinn was a considered
a 'person' under § 1983.104
The next issue was whether the EPA implementing
regulations constituted enforceable "rights secured by the
Constitution and laws."1 0 5 To make this determination, the court
looked to see whether rights were created by either the EPA's §
602 implementing regulations specifically or federal agency
regulations generally. 10 6 Again relying on Supreme Court
precedent, the South Camden I court held that the defendants'
alleged violation of EPA's Title VI implementing regulations may
10 7
have violated a federal right.
After an exhaustive summary of the law, the South Camden
I court granted the preliminary injunction to plaintiffs pursuant
to a § 1983 cause of action enforcing EPA regulations. 108
Justice Stevens' dissent in Sandoval did not articulate what
a plaintiff would have to prove in a § 1983 cause of action, except
to say that a violation of regulations adopted pursuant to Title
VI may be established by proof of a discriminatory impact. 10 9
Therefore, it is fair to assume that he meant to uphold the idea
of a private cause of action pursuant to the federal agency
regulations implementing § 602 and retain the lower disparate
impact burden of proof.

acting in their official capacities, "when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person
under § 1983 because 'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated
as actions against the State.' " See Powell, 189 F.3d at 401 (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)).
Municipalities, municipal officials, and local governmental units do not have the
Eleventh Amendment immunity granted to States preventing their liability for
monetary damages, declarative judgments or injunctive relief. See Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
104 See South Camden I, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
105 Id. at 526 (finding that for plaintiffs to be able to bring suit, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the language of § 1983 to mean that plaintiffs must assert the
violation of a federal right and not just a federal law).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 529 (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke, 479 U.S. 418 (1987)). The court
also applied a three part test as set forth in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
301-03 (1979), which held that regulations have the "force and effect" of law if they:
(1) are substantive, (2) Congress granted the issuing agency the authority to
promulgate such regulations, and (3) the regulations were instituted pursuant to
Congressionally imposed procedural requirements. The court concluded that the
EPA's regulations fulfilled the three requirements and did therefore operate with
the "force and effect of law." Id. at 528-29.
108 Id.

at 542.

109 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 301, 312 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Section 1983 has been criticized as an avenue of relief for
environmental justice plaintiffs.
Critics have interpreted
Supreme Court cases and other court cases as standing for the
proposition that in equal protection claims, a finding of
intentional discrimination is necessary to succeed. 10 In the
cases analyzed, the plaintiffs did not bring suit alleging
violations of a statute or a federally protected right, and courts
have viewed claims as potential equal protection violations
against state actors under § 1983.111 Similarly, when plaintiffs
have sued for alleged violations of statutes deemed to have
comprehensive enforcement schemes under § 1983, courts have
analyzed such claims as requiring a showing of intentional
discrimination as required in the context of the Equal Protection
clause.112
Another issue potentially undermining the availability of
§ 1983 as a way to enjoin policies resulting in a discriminatory
disparate impact, is whether the § 602 regulations create
federally protected rights. Although beyond the scope of this
paper, there is an issue as to whether a court should apply the
Cort v. Ash test 113 or the Blessing v. Freestone test 114 to
110 See Geiger, supra note 3, at 210-11 (1998) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), which held that success under a § 1983 claim requires a showing of
intentional discrimination); see also Bean v. S.W. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp.
673, 681 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (dismissing the complaint despite finding that the
evidence presented, although showing the facility's location was both "insensitive
and illogical," was not enough to show intentional discrimination and therefore
dismissed the complaint).
11 See Geiger, supra note 3, at 210-11.
112 See Notari v. Denver Water Dep't., 971 F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir. 1992)
(allowing § 1983 claim to go forward alleging a violation of the Equal Protection
claim); Foster v. Wyrick, 823 F.2d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that Title VII
had a comprehensive enforcement section and therefore plaintiff could not assert a
Title VII disparate impact claim under § 1983, but was allowed to assert an equal
protection claim); Merwine v. Bd. of Trs., 754 F.2d 631, 635, 639 (5th Cir. 1985)
(separating § 1983 intentional discrimination and Title VII disparate impact
discrimination); Peters v. Lieuallen, 746 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs § 1983 claim because he failed to show that
defendants acted with intentional discrimination); Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611,
618 (6th Cir. 1980) (grouping the XIV Amendment and § 1983 together to find that
the statistical evidence was enough to show an intentional violation of both as to
some of defendant's practices and remanded for further examination of other
practices).
113 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (creating a four-prong test to determine whether a
private right of action exists under a statute expressly providing for one).
114 520 U.S. 329, 338 (1997) (creating a three-prong test to determine whether
plaintiffs have the right to sue under § 1983).
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determine whether § 602 creates a federally protected right and
allows a plaintiff to enforce that right under § 1983. This is a
different inquiry than the question posed in Sandoval, where the
Supreme Court considered whether Congress intended for a
private cause of action or whether the Court had previously
interpreted § 602 as conferring a private cause of action. 115 A
§ 1983 claim is evaluated under different criteria, as it does not
confer a federally protected right, but is instead a "vehicle to
seek a federal remedy for violations" of federal rights by state
actors. 116 In this context, § 602 must be analyzed to determine
whether it creates federally protected rights, which private
plaintiffs may then seek to vindicate under § 1983.
2.

The Takings Clause and Causes of Action Thereunder

Both federal and state governments enjoy the power of
eminent domain, which allows the government to condemn
private property and to allocate it for public use. 11 7 Once this
power is utilized, however, "just compensation" must be paid to
the property owner." 8 The state has the power to regulate
property use through its police powers, even if the subsequent
regulation substantially decreases the value or diminishes the
owner's use of the property. 1 9 Arguably, minority communities
are not full participants in the political process. As such, the
Takings Clause should be interpreted to "bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all

115 See supra notes 53, 57 and accompanying text.
116

Foster, 823 F.2d at 221 (citing Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418, 1427-28 (5th

Cir. 1984)).
117

See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public

use, without just compensation.") This is applicable to the state governments
through the XIV Amendment.. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("[Nlor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law"). Eminent domain is defined as "[tihe power to take private property for public
use by the state, municipality, and private persons or corporation authorized to
exercise functions of public character." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1991).
118 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Nolan v. CA Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831
(1987) (stating "Indeed, one of the principal uses of the eminent domain power is to
assure that the government be able to require conveyance of just such interests, so
long as it pays for them") (emphasis added).
119 The State may also regulate property uses that the common law would

recognize as a public nuisance without providing compensation regardless of the
effect on the value of the land. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1010 (1992) (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
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fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' 20
The Takings Clause, as applied in the environmental justice
context, could compensate property-owning plaintiffs for
governmental action (referred to as the siting of an undesirable
land use) that constructively 'takes' the plaintiffs property by
destroying the owner's economic use and enjoyment of the land
due to leaks, smell, contamination, etc.121
This type of
governmental action could also be considered a physical taking if
any contaminants traveled through the air, water, or soil and
1 22
rendered the affected property uninhabitable.
The threshold issue for a claim challenging a siting decision
under the Takings Clause is whether the case is ripe for
review. 123 Ripeness is a key issue in whether a federal court has
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim and is able to render a
decision. 124 For a case to be ripe, there must be a final and
reviewable decision regarding the application of the
governmental regulation to the plaintiffs property. Secondly,
the plaintiff must show that all state procedures for obtaining
125
compensation for the taking have been utilized.
120 Geiger, supra note 3, at 225 (quoting Professor William M. Treanor, The
Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 782, 877 (1995)).
121 Id. at 232. Although violations of the Takings Clause occur when the
government has not given a private person compensation for "taking" his property,
injunctive relief is also available to plaintiffs to prevent any unnecessary injury. See
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (allowing temporary
injunctive relief from any impediment due to the state regulation); see also Brody v.
Vill. of Port Chester, 261 F.3d 288 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing the district court's grant
of a temporary injunction finding that condemnee did not suffer an actual or
threatened injury and that the public interests outweighed the condemnee's
interests).
122 See Geiger, supra note 3, at 232 (recognizing the state's legitimate interest,
but arguing that it is "inherently unjust to ignore the tremendous burden that is
placed upon residents in communities affected by polluting facilities").
123 Numerous cases have failed for not being ripe for review. See id. at 226-27.
124 See, e.g., Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 591 (11th
Cir. 1997).
125 Geiger, supra note 3, at 227 (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)). This leads to the conclusion
that a plaintiff may not have standing until after the taking has occurred. Id. at
230. See Sinclair Oil Co. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 407 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding plaintiffs taking clause claims unripe when facially challenging a
claim for depriving landowner of economic use); Langley Land Co. v. Monroe
County, 738 F. Supp. 1571 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (finding that the proposed condemnation
of plaintiffs land was not final nor was it a taking and therefore there was no
standing for plaintiffs to bring suit). Furthermore, the court said, "[any injury that
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Jurisprudence on this issue has been separated into two
126
regulatory takings and physical takings.
categories:
According to Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 27 a
plaintiff seeking compensation for a regulatory taking must
prove that the regulation rendered the property economically
idle or prohibited all economically beneficial use of the land. 12
As for a physical taking, the only requirement is a "permanent,
physical occupation" of the land as a result of the government
action. 129 Arguably, toxins and particulate matter released from
undesirable land uses constitute permanent invasions, entitling
property owner plaintiffs to compensation. 13 0 With regard to a
may be inflicted is too uncertain and hinges upon too many contingencies to be
justiciable." Id. at 1575 (emphasis added).
126 See Geiger, supra note 3, at 231 (stating that a regulatory taking occurs
when a government imposes condition limits or prohibits the plaintiffs beneficial
use of the land, a physical taking occurs when the government physically
appropriates private land for public use, and arguing that this distinction is key to
the ultimate success of the claim); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384
(1994) (stating that a taking includes instances when the government deprives a
landowner of the right to exclude others); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (invalidating a statute which required landlords to allow
cable television companies to install their equipment on the landlord's property).
127 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
128 Id. at 1019. The court may also take into account the purposes and economic
effects of the government actions. An inquiry is made into the legitimacy of the state
interests in implementing the regulation leading to the taking as well as the
reduction in value of claimant's land. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)
(finding that in order for a land use regulation to be a taking, it must "not
substantially advance the state's interests" or "den[y] an owner economically viable
use of his land") (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138
n.36 (1978)); see also Florida Rock Indus. v. U. S., 18 F.3d 1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (stating that a regulation having the effect of completely depriving the
property owner of economic use of the land is the equivalent of a physical taking
and thus no balance of interests is necessary). See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Although the government can defend the regulation
by asserting that it is prohibiting a nuisance, that defense has a balancing aspect to
it as well.
129 See Geiger, supra note 3, at 235-36 (noting that some courts have extended
the nile to include "constructive" takings when a government action interferes not
with the land directly, but with the property owner's fundamental rights); see also
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384.
130 See Geiger, supra note 3, at 237 (analogizing the Supreme Court's ruling in
Causby v. U.S., 328 U.S. 256 (1946), where the Court held that continuous invasions
of the owner's airspace constituted a taking within the Fifth Amendment, to
continuous invasion of toxins and chemicals released by undesirable land uses into
the air, soil, and water of adjacent property owners); see also Ortega Cabrera v.
Mun. of Bayamon, 562 F.2d 91, 101 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating that if the garbage dump
had the effect of preventing plaintiffs' enjoyment of any use of a creek on their land,
they might have a "strong" case that the government destroyed the value of that
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regulatory taking, it would be very difficult to prove that having
an undesirable land use nearby substantially lowered or
completely destroyed any economic value of the land.
C.

Administrative:Alter the Way the EPA Handles Disparate
Impact Claims
For the last few years, the EPA has operated under the
agency's "Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI
Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits." 13 1 Pursuant
to these guidelines, a plaintiff must file a signed complaint with
132
the EPA within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory acts.
The EPA then engages in preliminary fact-finding to determine
133
the validity of a discriminatory disparate impact complaint.
The plaintiff has no role in the investigation or adjudication of
the complaint. If the EPA's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) finds
insufficient evidence, there is no procedure for the complainant
to appeal the OCR's findings. 13 4 If the OCR determines that
there has been a violation of § 602, it first attempts to secure
voluntary compliance with the offending party. 135 If that fails,
the OCR then has the authority to terminate federal funding to
the violator. Unlike the frustrated complainant, however, the

portion of the land); Adelung v. Township of Jackson, Civ. No. 79-2613, 1982 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18173, at * 21-23 (D. N.J. Oct. 22, 1982) (unpublished opinion) (finding
that plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to prove a partial taking through the
loss of their water wells and other property damage as a result of leaked chemicals
from defendant's landfill); Dutton v. Crest Hill, 547 F. Supp. 38, 39-40 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (giving plaintiffs a chance to prove that the flooding of their lands with
sewage water from defendants' plant interfered with their property to a degree that
it amounted to an easement); Clark v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 649, 649, 652 (1985)
(finding that plaintiff could prove a taking by showing the seepage of chemicals
amounted to an easement that subjected the land to a servitude which partially
destroyed its value).
131 EPA: Interim Guidance for Investigating
Title VI Administrative
Complaints Challenging Permits (August 28, 2000) [hereinafter Interim Guidance]
at http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/interim.pdf (searched Oct. 12, 2001).
132 Worsham, supra note 3, at 648.
133 See id. at 649 (stating that the EPA will undertake a five step analysis to
determine the validity of a disparate impact claim by identifying the population
affected by the permit, determining the racial/ethnic composition of the population,
determining what other permitted facilities should be factored into the analysis, and
then, using all of that information, comparing the racial characteristics of the
adversely affected population with the non-affected population).
134 See Mank, Title VI, supra note 29, at 29.
135 Worsham, supra note 3, at 649-50.
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recipient may ask for a judicial review of the OCR's decision. 136
Unfortunately, a plaintiff who proceeds under a formal § 602
administrative proceeding cannot receive damages or injunctive
relief, 137 and therefore, the EPA is not able to impose those types
of relief.
Although private plaintiffs do not have a role in the
complaint process, the EPA investigatory process may force
compliance or kill a project if put into motion before the
undesired facility is built. 138
Moreover, although an EPA
investigation into a Title VI violation may not result in a positive
outcome for the plaintiffs, it is time consuming, which in turn
raises costs. 1 39 If a community was passionately opposed to the
siting of an undesirable land use and was willing to devote the
time and effort to oppose it, then the delay and subsequent
increased cost might be enough to alter the siting location. In
other instances, that delay might be enough for the corporation
140
to scrap their plans and relocate to another community.
D. Differences Between Suit Under § 602 and OtherAvenues for
Relief
As the Supreme Court has determined, there is no longer a
private cause of action for enforcement of federal agency Title VI
disparate impact regulations. Even more disturbing is the
potential invalidation of regulations promulgated under Title
VI.' 4 '
Assuming, however, the validity of the. regulations,
environmental justice plaintiffs may not be able to turn to those
regulations in hopes of fighting discrimination.
In order to use § 602, a plaintiff must allege a disparate
impact against a recipient of federal funds. Compared with the
standard of intentional discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause, alleging disparate impact is relatively easy.
136 40 C.F.R. § 7.130 (b)(2)(i), (ii) (2001). The recipient has 30 days after the
receipt of the formal finding of noncompliance to request a hearing before an EPA
administrative law judge.
137 Chester Residents v. Seif; 944 F. Supp. 413, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd, 132
F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998).
138 See Mank, Title VI, supra note 29, at 48.
139 See id.
140 See id. (citing the abandonment of plans of a plastics factory by Shintech in
"Cancer Alley", Lousianna, due to the length of time the EPA took to reach a final
decision on the Title VI complaint).
141 See supra text accompanying note 58.
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Yet it is still difficult to prove disparate impact as statistics can
be interpreted in various ways and no standard exists to define
an adversely affected "group," "area," or "impact."142 A second
major problem for plaintiffs is that defendants may still prevail,
even following the establishment of a prima facie case of
disparate impact by proving a justification for the policy. 143 This
would relieve liability regardless of whether the alleged
justification was the driving force in siting the undesirable land
use in a predominantly minority area as opposed to somewhere
else.
Although § 601 and the equal protection clause are still
available causes of action, they will continue to stand unused
due to the heavy burden of proof. As the dissent in Sandoval
pointed out, and the district court in South Camden elaborated
on, however, there still may be hope for a cause of action alleging
only a disparate impact under § 1983. The main difference
between the two causes of action is that instead of showing that
the defendant is a recipient of federal funds under § 602, under
§ 1983 the plaintiff must show that the defendant is a person
acting under state authority. As we have seen in the South
Camden cases, state officials acting in their official capacities are
considered "persons" when the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.
Presumably, agencies or officials acting under state law are (in
most cases) the equivalent to state recipients of federal funds;
therefore, there is no difference between the two causes of action
in that regard. 144
It seems as though unless the Court
142 ZYGMUNT

J.B.

PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,

AND SOCIETY 1150 n.11 (2d ed. 1998) (posing the following questions: (1) how far
back in time should a court go in analyzing past siting decisions; (2) which

individuals

should be

considered

"minorities"; (3)

what

percentage

of a

neighborhood block need be affected for the entire block to be considered "affected";

and (4) what the baseline geographic unit should be).
143 See supra notes 42-45. Furthermore, in all fairness, the question whether "it
[is]
racism for corporate managers to seek out (1) the most inexpensive land, and (2)

areas where they will face the least effective political opposition and the most

desperate welcome for jobs and economic activity" should be asked. PLATER, supra
note 142, at 1150.
144Michele L. Knorr, Environmental Injustice: Inequities Between Empirical
Data and Federal,State Legislative and JudicialResponses, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L.
71, 96 (1997) (finding that most states receive "much of their environmental budgets
from the federal government through statutes such as the CAA, CWA, CERCLA,
and RCRA". See generally Susan E. Leckrone, Turning Back the Clock: The
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 and Its Effective Repeal of Environmental
Legislation, 71 IND. L. J. 1029 (1996).
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invalidates the federal agency implementing regulations which
prohibit disparate effects, environmental justice plaintiffs have
not lost much ground. As with § 602 causes of action against
state officials, plaintiffs pursuing claims under § 1983 are more
145
likely to receive injunctive relief rather than money damages.
The cause of action utilizing the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment allows plaintiffs compensation for policies already
enacted which render the property owner's land useless or
interfere with the property owner's rights to the land itself, or its
use and enjoyment. This is not the most suitable action for
communities looking to prevent undesirable land uses from
entering their community, but it might be useful to those
plaintiffs who have suffered due to the effects of an adverse land
use for some time.
It seems that minority groups and communities need to
band together and increase their political power to amend the
statute or alter the way the EPA handles complaints
administratively. 146 There have been several grassroots
1 47
movements that have been able to win victories sporadically,
but more sweeping changes require a greater unified front.
Realistically, such a concerted effort is easier said than done due
to conflicting goals among members of the community. Although
some members of the community may not want the undesirable
land use, there are others who welcome it and the revenues and
jobs it offers to the community. 148 Furthermore, as Robert
Bullard pointed out, the majority of black communities do not
have the resources to fight long-term battles against unpopular
1
facilities. 49
145 As previously discussed, this rule does not apply to municipal officials and
1.
therefore they could be liable for money damages.
146 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 2, at 165 (citations omitted).
147 For example, a group of women in South Central Los Angeles joined
together and successfully fought off a proposed solid waste incinerator. See Cynthia
Hamilton, Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, at 207, 218
(Bullard ed., 1994).
148 See Mank, Title VI, supra note 5, at 46-47 (showing that when the Shintech
corporation proposed building a $700 million plastics facility along Louisiana's
"Cancer Alley", there was a large amount of support for the factory since it would
have employed 2000 temporary construction workers, 165 permanent employees,
and 90 permanent contract employees); see also ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN
DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 90 (1990).
149 See BULLARD, supra note 148, at 18. A campaign of that nature is very time
consuming, requires a good deal of organization, and it requires the services of
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CONCLUSION: IS THE SANDOVAL DECISION THE FATAL BLOW TO
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?

Although the Sandoval decision demonstrated the Court's
inclination against expanding the scope of Title VI, the decision
is not the end of the fight. It closed one avenue for plaintiffs to
assert their claims, but they are not left completely helpless.
Even more harmful to plaintiffs than the Supreme Court's recent
decision, is the possibility that the § 602 implementing
regulations may be found invalid. Even if the implementing
regulations are valid, another problem may be that they do not
in themselves create a federal right enforceable under § 1983. If
this is to be, the Supreme Court will not only have bound the
hands of private plaintiffs, but those of the federal agencies who
have identified the problem and begun to combat it.
Regardless of the legal theory under which environmental
justice plaintiffs bring suit, communities working together to
block the placing of adverse facilities in their neighborhoods can
be a powerful weapon.
Still, in most situations these
communities need judicial and legislative assistance to
effectively fight the imbalanced distribution of societal harms
among different racial and economic classes.

lawyers, toxicologists, hydrologists, and environmental engineers. Id. This
sentiment was echoed by Reverend Horance Strand when the Chester, PA situation.
He said:
Environmental racism is not totally, 'I'm doing this because you are black.'
It is, 'I'm doing this because there are certain conditions which exist in
your community that make you open game.' They know that a well-to-do
white community can put up a fight. The poor and the black don't have
those resources. We have never controlled the economy.
See Matthew P. Weinstock, Tired of Being Dumped On, 56 OCcUPATIONAL
HAZARDS 48 (1994).

